Why Great Companies Get Started in the Downturns

I have always been amazed by how many of our success tech stories, as well as Fortune 500 companies, started during drastic down turns. Innovation does not take a holiday, and in fact, thrives during difficult times when pain & need are greatest. While the current downturn is historic, it pails in comparison to the 22 year depression the US experienced from 1873 to 1895, triggered by the Vienna stock market crash.  During this extended drought, a large number of Fortune 500's & major corporations started including Eli Lilly, IBM, Merck, Hershey's, Gillette, Alcoa, J&J, Chevron, GE, AT&T, Abbott, Lilly, Coors, Johnson Controls, Bristol-Myers and PPG to name a few.

During the great depression (1929-1939), Texas Instruments, HP, 20th Century Fox and United Technologies all launched. Since much of the Valley's legacy came out of HP, the seeds for the current Silicon Valley were planted while the stock market was crashing nearly 90% and unemployment approached 30%.

Other periods: during the Oil shock & market crash (1973-1976) Microsoft, Genentech & Apple started. The biotech and PC revolutions emerged when the market was down nearly 50% and inflation was racing into double digits.  In the crisis of the early 80's (1980-1982) with mortgage rates peaking at nearly 21%, Amgen, Sun, E*Trade, Autodesk, Adobe, BMC, EA and Symantec were created. The question is why does this happen?

Dogs Will Try New Dog Food
When everything is going well, few people or companies want to change behavior, process or vendors. They have little incentive to do so and risk upsetting the apple cart. However, when their hair is on fire, customers & business partners are willing to try new or different approaches to address the pain. So, while some would say that sales cycles stretch out significantly during downturns, I would argue that for new technologies that solve real problems, they compress considerably.

Take Care of Darwin
Leading entrepreneurs have a maniacal focus on efficient use of capital and on fulfilling customer needs (versus nice to have's). During troubled times, these entrepreneurs are even more focused on these. Cash is spent only when absolutely necessary and no to few features are built that aren't demanded by the customer. Those less disciplined will find themselves victim to Darwinian realities. Companies "forged in hell" have a much more durable and advantaged DNA coming out.

Power of an Equity Culture
In these times, firms either bootstrap or fund themselves from modest equity rounds. Credit, other than credit cards and such, is not readily available. Furthermore, the start-up world is an equity culture versus the credit/debt culture of buyouts. So, they are able to survive when banks won't lend and credit lines are non-existent. Equity can be a beautiful thing.

Weak Gazelles are pruned
During boom times, sectors get overfunded and weaker competitors destroy the economics for everyone involved. They create significant noise in the market place, create skeptical customers by overpromising and underdelivering and have undisciplined pricing policies. In hard times, there are many fewer competitors which allow companies to scale quietly during the trough and take significant market share when conditions improve. Furthermore, these firms enjoy rational pricing, higher profitability/margins and lower cost structures given their DNA.

So, yes it is ugly out there and about to get even harder but start-ups are used to hard times and are well suited, if managed properly, to thrive in the downturn and accelerate during the recovery. The trick is to stay alive one day longer than your competitors…

Why VC Returns Languish

So you see a pattern here?

Number of VC-backed IPO's:
1995    205
1996    272
1997    138
1998      68
1999    250
2000    202
2001      22
2002      20
2003      23
2004      67
2005      43
2006      56
2007      76
2008        7 (none in Q2 or Q4!)

Average Time to IPO
1998    3 years
2008    9 years

Number of Companies Funded:
1998    1,896 ($14.0B invested)
2008    1,930 ($14.1B invested)

When you cut through all of this data, what you see is that VC's portfolios have filled up with deals while there has been little liquidity.  With 1,930 companies funded but only 7 IPO's (and another 300 M&A's), you have a lot of overhang in the existing company portfolios. The average time to exit has grown linearly since 2000. For entrepreneurs, what this means is exits will take longer to realize, requiring a long-term perspective to decision making and strategy.  Also, VC's are going to be very pre-occupied managing existing companies and have less time to a) due new deals and b) spend time with those deals.

The IPO machine will not likely return until the markets have hit bottom, stabilized and begun their growth again. Additionally, the notion of a promising $30m in revenue company (like Apple was) going public has been replaced by $100m thresholds. This means M&A is the primary driver of exits for some time ahead, which requires less swinging for the fences and more low burn/capital raised.

Interesting stats…

Josh Lerner on Serial Entrepreneurs

"A good hockey player plays where the puck is. A great hockey player plays where the puck is going to be."
        — Wayne Gretzky

peHUB had a recent post by Connie Lolzos on Josh Lerner's recent research about serial entrepreneurs. There are two general camps. One states that success begets success and serial entrepreneurs are likely to repeat. Lightning does strike twice (or three, four, etc times). Another position is that success is driven predominantly by serendipity which greatly reduces the chance of serial success. Furthermore, once a founder has hit it big, is he/she as hungry the second time when their bank account overflows.

Josh Lerner looked at a cut of data around success rates of serial and first time entrepreneurs (Paper link: Download 09-028
). As Connie mentions:

According to its authors, including renowned HBS professor Josh Lerner,
successful entrepreneurs have a 34 percent chance of succeeding in the
next venture-backed firm, compared with 23 percent who failed
previously, and 22 percent chance for new venture-backed entrepreneurs.
(Honestly, I had no idea new entrepreneurs, or even second-time
entrepreneurs with one failed company, had a one in five chance of
succeeding. If I were a new venture-backed entrepreneur, I’d be pretty
heartened by that data. Those are way better odds than you’ll find in,
say, the restaurant business.)

This would support the serial entrepreneur camp's claims obviously. Furthermore, it also quantifies the chance of success for those first time entrepreneurs…around one-in-four. I would imagine that this number goes up significantly during downturns like today when competition is reduced and a likely liquidity event occuring during a market recover (in 3-4 years).  Timing of launch has a strong impact on venture success.  Lerner comments that great entrepreneurs are more likely to launch during these times and have the vision to see what could be versus what is.

Connie also pointed another interesting fact about how many venture backed deals involve serial entrepreneurs. It looks like only 13-16% of the time do VC's back serial entrepreneurs. So, 6 out of 7 times, a new entrepreneurial team (often coming from other start-ups though) gets the VC money. Another positive for emerging entrepreneurs.

Apple Slices

I came across an article from last year from Fortune, Steve Jobs Speaks Out, in which Steve discusses Apple's approach to business and innovation as well as its culture. Entrepreneurship is part passion & execution and part mentoring. The best entrepreneurs continually learn from the examples of those around them. They are curious about what lessons others have learned or what experiences others have had. You can learn in one of two ways: do it yourself or learn from the mistakes/successes of others. Clearly, nothing repeats itself so these efforts are more about creating, as Charlie Munger says, "Lattices of Mental Models". He is an avid student of a broad array of disciplines which he applies across discipline. Anyways, interesting article…

…Or Assuredly We Shall All Hang Separately

"We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately." — Benjamin Franklin at the signing of the Declaration of Independence

Dan Primack set off an interesting dialog around his article Radically Reinventing Venture Capital. There is a growing wave of articles about new or revised models and debate around what went wrong.  He described a suggestion by one Boston VC who proposes that LP’s think about funding individual VC’s as single partner entities. These are all interesting and thoughtful discussions, but I believe that they are over thinking things. I offer that the heart of our issues rest in our industry’s compensation incentives mixed with a fine market melt down.

Venture capital used to be a business about creating revolutionary businesses to change the world for the better. Wealth was driven by carry, the GP’s share of profitable investments. Investor, entrepreneur and VC were aligned, all focused on profitable investing. This has broken down.

The LP community has moved aggressively into alternative assets to kick start unfunded obligations. Furthermore, consultants, advisors and staff have concentrated this capital on a shrinking list of investment firms.

At the same time, market disruptions have basically shut down the IPO world and the VC’s main escape hatch. With public options diminished, acquisition multiples have declined, which has reduced the frequency and size of investment exits. For example, while investments normally take 3-6 years for exit, in this environment, only 20% of deals have exited since 2003. This had backed up VC’s portfolios.

The toxic result is that VC’s look increasingly to management fees instead of carry for compensation. This breaks the alignment between LP & GP. This incents & focuses VC’s on raising larger funds, more often and deploying it quickly.  If a group raises $800m every two years, it adds management fee in $20m per year chunks. Three funds, eight partners leads to $6-8m/yr per partner in just fees. Carry is a nice to have versus need to have.

As long as LP’s go along with this, things won’t change. Unless the money drives this, behavior & incentives won’t change. They need to regain the alignment between their interests and the VC’s.  One heretical idea would be to move current compensation from being based on assets under management to salary based with escalators. By relatively fixing the current compensation regardless of assets (increase it for new hires), VC’s will have less incentive to raise capital for the sake of driving current fee. Rather, they will be focused more on the carry. Granted, carry grows with fund size assuming returns are the same, but we all know that returns suffer when funds are too big and are deployed too quickly. So, there is some governing factor to imprudent asset accumulation.

I also liked the structure of Warren Buffett’s first funds. He established a base rate (say a 6% return) upon which no carry was charged. So, the first 6% of IRR is free which makes sense, as venture’s goal is to drive alpha above more conservative asset classes. Unlike with hurdle rates, he did not have a “catch-up” after 6%. Rather, he charged 25% of the profit above the 6%. So, a VC is worse off (from a traditional 20% carry) until IRR’s in the low teens and then better off above the low teens. This gave no bonus for poor results and superior compensation for strong results.

I don’t know if the LP community has the appetite for this kind of approach regarding fees. They are fighting to get allocation into a narrowing list of venture firms so are unlikely to rock the boat for fear of exclusion. They are, unfortunately, in for a rude awakening if they can’t find another way to align their interest with those they entrust their capital.

The Downside of Options

Minus 23 degrees. That was the absolute temperature this morning as I went out to the airport. This probably nets out to minus 30-40 wind chill. This redefines how icy cold the financial markets are. This is also what makes Midwesterners so decent and hearty. Winter puts everything in perspective !

With that said, I wanted to throw out a topic that I have pondered quite a bit — how effective are options at aligning the interests of management and Investors?

The rationale behind options is that by giving employees equity in their firm, they will think and act more like shareholders. Therefore, they are incented to act so as to maximize the future value of their stock. Additionally, this allows them to participate in the, hopefully, significant increase in company value driven by their efforts.

On the surface, this appears to make sense, especially on the upside. However, things begin to breakdown on the downside. For one, if the company underperforms or requires significant equity, Investors will suffer significant dilution unless they continue to put ever increasing amounts of money to work. Management will push for additional option grants to be made whole. This begins to make them less dilution sensitive while also further diluting Investors. Management pushes for options, which are in essence free, rather than asking to protect their ownership by buying shares. This often leads to tense discussions between Investors and management.

The second, and I would argue more troubling, issue is that options create asymetrical alignment of interest. Investors are committed and have their capital wed to the company in both the upside and downside scenarios. Options, unlike purchased stock, have no downside cost or “loss” (other than lost upside) to their holder. As a result, this does not create the stickiness or alignment that having financial skin in the game does.

Before the craziness of the Bubble, it was standard for VC’s to look at how much networth an entrepreneur had invested in the business. The reasoning went that if this was high, then the entrepreneur, having “burnt the ships”, would fight like a caged tiger for the success of the business. However, as money poured into venture and deals grew more competitive, fewer and fewer teams had large chunks of skin in the game.

Where this creates a disfunctional situation is when management, or more often a hired gun CEO with a big option package, underperforms. There is little cost to leaving. If conditions worsen and it looks like the business will need massive effort for a period of time to turn around, management may begin to look at opportunity cost. Would they be better off spending the next three years at a more promising start up?

Sure, they walk away from future option value, but are relatively unencumbered. They are not nearly as tied to the company as managers with money in the deal. This fact creates surreal negotiating leverage for them as they can threaten to leave the Company if not given more stock. Investors, on the other hand, have their capital locked up in the firm (as they should).

Sometimes, managers ask to be able to buy stock so as to start their capital gains clock. However, they often ask for a non-recourse note from the Company to do this. The result is that should the firm fail to perform (or they fail to perform), they can walk away from both the stock and note (as it is non-recourse).

Unfortunately, this downside scenario is much more common than one would expect (or than Investors would like).

My trouble with this is that Investors and Managers enter into a pact to build a company together and remain committed in good and bad times. This contract falls apart when one party can back out of the deal.

This post is not to rail against hard working entrepreneurs. Far from it, as the great majority of them stay committed and fight hard to the very end. Rather, this a complaint against an incentive structure that is flawed and can undermine the Investor/Entrepreneur relationship. I would argue that requiring management to purchase a portion of their equity (options for the remainder) would actually lead to a more stable company and stronger alignment of interests. Will this feature come back into focus or will VC’s push for disfunctional features for protection like 2x liquidation preferences. We will see.

There are an array of investor centric factors that also undermine this contract but those can be saved for a future post…

Don’t Give Up Too Soon

I heard a recent statistic from a Harvard study on successful sales management. In the study (caveat: which I have not seen), it supposedly concluded that a business sale takes 7 meetings on average to close. It also mentioned that the average salesman stops pursuing the sale after 5.4 meetings.  I am not certain what happens to these numbers in this more challenging environment but what it does show is that a) most people give up too early on potential sales and b) sales come from familiarity/trust which takes time and frequency to build. Often, the successful sale today comes from months (or more likely years) of cultivating relationships and staying in front of prospects. So, I'd be curious to see what happens to results if people systematically persisted with two more meetings, on average, when they were about to give up or move onto other prospects. Anyways, another data point on the power of persistence…

Outliers and the Causes of Success

"The brick walls are there for a reason. The brick walls are not
there to keep us out; the brick walls are there to give us a chance to
show how badly we want something. The brick walls are there to stop the people who don't want it badly enough. They are there to stop the other people!
"
                — Randy Pausch, The Last Lecture

I have always been interested in the studies on the "Expert". In these challenging markets, resilience becomes increasingly central to success. Why is it that the middle or high school star (President, etc) is usually not the eventual star in life from the class? How can two people grow up in the same environment and the one with less innate skill end up succeeding? How can 10 start-ups launch and one pulls away from the pack even though it did not have the "rockstar" team?

I have posted twice on the subject — The Expert Mind and The Passion for Greatness. With the publication of Malcolm Gladwell's book, Outliers: The Story of Success, there is increasing discussion around this topic now. Gladwell confirms previous research that lays out that success is not driven by innate ability (though "nature" does bracket how far "nuture" can go). He describes how "purposeful" hours of practice are a key driver (10,000 hour rule) and also concludes that environment & circumstances also play a considerable role.  This applies not only to athletics (Jordan/Woods are the first to practice and last to leave…obsession on improvement) but business as well. He describes how Bill Gates was able to launch Microsoft because his school had access in the late 1960's to mainframe computers when others didn't (environment gave him a leg up).

In a recent NY Times editorial, Lost in the Crowd, David Brooks takes exception with the over-emphasis on environment over initiative. One of our local entrepreneurial stars, Howard Tullman, emphasized one section in an email he sent around. I agree fully with the conclusion that success, while enhanced by environment/fate, is eventually driven by effort and passion. As Jim Clark, founder of Silicon Graphics, Netscape, Healtheon/WebMD & myCFO, once said, "Great companies are willed into existence". From Howard's excerpt:

"Yet, I can’t help but feel that Gladwell and others who share his
emphasis are getting swept away by the coolness of the new discoveries.
They’ve lost sight of the point at which the influence of social forces
ends and the influence of the self-initiating individual begins.

Most successful people begin with two beliefs: the future can be better
than the present, and I have the power to make it so. They were often
showered by good fortune, but relied at crucial moments upon
achievements of individual will.

Most successful people also
have a phenomenal ability to consciously focus their attention. We know
from experiments with subjects as diverse as obsessive-compulsive
disorder sufferers and Buddhist monks that people who can
self-consciously focus attention have the power to rewire their brains.

Control of attention is the ultimate individual power. People
who can do that are not prisoners of the stimuli around them. They can
choose from the patterns in the world and lengthen their time horizons.
This individual power leads to others. It leads to self-control, the
ability to formulate strategies in order to resist impulses. If forced
to choose, we would all rather our children be poor with self-control
than rich without it.

It leads to resilience, the ability to
persevere with an idea even when all the influences in the world say it
can’t be done. A common story among entrepreneurs is that people told
them they were too stupid to do something, and they set out to prove
the jerks wrong."

Tips for Networking

With the markets (job & product) becoming tougher, people are spending increasing amounts of time trying to advance the ball.  If you are wishing that you had a larger network to work off of (don't we all…), I came across an interesting post on "4 Rules".  Jimmy Gardner, in a TECH cocktail piece, expanded on a post by Andrew Hoag in GigaOm "A First Timer's Tips to Networking" (so basically, I am providing no value add by two degrees of separation…). In particular, focus on #4. As times get harder, people tend to think of themselves and their own issues. They get very insular very quickly and end up feeling isolated and frustrated. Looking up every once and a while and seeing how you can help others or lend a hand will not only possibly take your mind off your own issues, but might even start the ol' Karma wheel spinning. Jimmy's Networking comments:

1. Never, ever, underestimate anyone

Ok I admit it, you probably have the same story, but at some event you see someone who acts a little odd, looks a little different and you may tend to shy away. But think about something, that may be the founder of the next big thing. And in talking with them and taking a few seconds to get to know them could lead you places you may have never envisioned.

2. Be genuine.

Dont give people anything but who you are. They see through the facade much easier and faster than you would ever imagine.

3. Be patient.

You probably are not going to make that blockbuster deal right there after the intro over a cocktail. Just follow the other rules here and then see how things go. After events I go home, take all the business cards I have gathered and enter them into some for of CRM, like Higherise form the 37 Signals guys. I also note how and when I met them and what they do as best I can remember. I also take a minute to give a quick hello/follow up email to them. It keeps the dialogue going and you never know were that continued dialogue can take you.

4. Give before you get.

I have heard this a lot and try to follow it to a tee. People dont want someone to walk up introduce themselves and start in on everything they have going on. As in #3, be patient in the moment, and get to know the other person. See what they have going on and ask questions. It will come back around to you, trust me.

The Riskmaster

Tim Draper has recently launched his blog, titled "The Riskmaster" (http://theriskmaster.blogspot.com/).  He will post on the venture capital business, spreading entrepreneurship, interesting videos and inspirations on the economy.  This blog is guaranteed to be entertaining, informative and challenging. For those of you not familiar with him, Tim is the founder of Draper Fisher Jurvetson and backed such hits as Skype and Hotmail. He has a long-term perspective on the business as his father founded Sutter Hill in the early 1960's and his grandfather is considered to be the first venture capitalist in California. He is also a huge source of positive optimism which is a scarce resource these days. Well worth reading!

 Tim_elephant